Puerto Morelos Official’s Secret Taxi Fleet Exposed

Puerto Morelos, Mexico — Abraham Masegosa Raña, the current chief of staff to Puerto Morelos Mayor Blanca Merari Tziu Muñoz, is alleged to be the concealed owner of a fleet of taxis and passenger vans in Cancún, a business that represents millions in income and a parallel power structure nourished by union ties and concessions obtained through political connections.

According to the 2011-2016 registry of the Single Front of Volante Workers (FUTV) in Benito Juárez, the name Abraham Masegosa Raña appears only once. On the surface, the now-public official would seemingly have the right to operate just a single taxi concession. However, the reality is reportedly very different.

Testimonies from "martillos"—as taxi drivers are known in local jargon—allege that Masegosa controls at least 20 permits, equivalent to the same number of concessions for both taxis and passenger vans, which would make him one of the most influential figures in Cancún's urban transport system.

A Lucrative Enterprise

Each permit represents a source of significant revenue. According to calculations by operators themselves, a single concession can generate net daily income of between 1,500 and 2,000 pesos. Multiplied by 20 units, this amounts to a business that easily surpasses one million pesos monthly, not including indirect income or the union dues he is attributed to receive as part of the leadership.

Taxi drivers from the Cancún Taxi Union have indicated that Masegosa's concessions did not appear out of nowhere. They were allegedly obtained when he was an official in the Benito Juárez municipality during the administration of Paul Carrillo (2013-2016). That period was pivotal in the discretionary distribution of taxi concessions in Cancún, marked by opacity and political privilege.

From Public Official to Union Power Broker

While hundreds of rank-and-file taxi drivers waited for years for the possibility of obtaining a single permit, individuals connected to power allegedly managed to accumulate dozens. It was there that Masegosa began weaving his network, first as a functionary with access to sensitive information and strategic contacts within the city hall, and later as a political operator placing his allies within the "Andrés Quintana Roo" Taxi Union, which is part of the FUTV and has historically controlled transport in Cancún.

With concessions in hand, Masegosa reportedly transitioned from being just another official to becoming part of the FUTV's union leadership. From that position, he consolidated his taxi fleet and integrated into a scheme where politics and unionism mix with practices of mutual protection.

According to gathered testimonies, this network not only allowed him to shield his interests within the union but also to build closer ties with criminal groups operating in the area. The Quintana Roo State Attorney General's Office has recently revealed links between transport operators, union leaders, and criminal cells that use public transport as a front for extortion, drug trafficking, or money laundering.

A Strategic Move to Puerto Morelos

Masegosa's move to the Puerto Morelos city hall was reportedly no coincidence. After consolidating his fleet in Cancún, he became one of the trusted men of Mayor Blanca Merari Tziu Muñoz. He now holds the position of chief of staff to the municipal president, a strategic post from which he manages the agenda, operational decisions, and, according to complaints, even municipal tenders and hiring.

This position not only grants him a monthly salary exceeding 40,000 pesos but also control over a network of operators that allows him to place relatives and friends in key positions, as occurred with his brother Álvaro, identified as the head of Material Resources and Supplies.

A Textbook Case of Conflict of Interest

The duality is clear: in Cancún, a transportation entrepreneur; in Puerto Morelos, a public official with political power. The case of Masegosa is presented as a textbook example of a conflict of interest—a public official who, from a public post, accumulates private wealth in a sector regulated by the very authorities with whom he has daily contact.

Rank-and-file taxi drivers know it and say it: while they wait years for a single concession, individuals like Masegosa allegedly manage to accumulate twenty. This inequality reportedly not only generates resentment but also fuels the perception that unionism and politics are territories reserved for an elite that shares the benefits while the base works exhaustive shifts for increasingly higher dues.

The Consequences of Concentrated Power

The concentration of concessions in the hands of politicians like Masegosa is alleged to have direct consequences, including unfair competition, institutionalized corruption, insecurity, and social inequality.

While Masegosa's figure has remained in the media background, his name is said to appear with increasing frequency in complaints and testimonies. For Mayor Blanca Merari, her closeness to an official accused of nepotism, private business, and shady union ties represents a significant political risk.

The case of the "hidden taxi czar" is presented as an example of how politics has become the perfect shortcut to enrich oneself with concessions, fleets, and union favors. The case of Abraham Masegosa Raña is described as synthesizing a pattern repeated in Quintana Roo: public officials use their positions not to serve, but to accumulate power and private wealth.