Venezuela Crisis Puts Yucatán Economy at Risk

Mérida, Yucatán — Yucatán may seem far removed from the situation triggered by the United States’ intervention in Venezuela, but there are threats to the Yucatecan economy that should not be overlooked, warns economist Javier Becerril García.

According to the research professor at the Faculty of Economics of the Autonomous University of Yucatán (Uady), impacts on tourism—a key driver of the Yucatecan economy—and on operations related to international trade are foreseeable.

Furthermore, he warns of risks of higher inflation resulting from international increases in fuel prices, which will inevitably influence the transportation of goods and the production of goods and services.

He also notes aspects related to the public sector, which must prepare for a potential economic environment very different from the current one.

The state executive, he points out, should “arm itself with a team of excellent advisors” and safeguard the budget of the “self-proclaimed historic package” of 66 billion pesos.

“The risk is broad and can scale down locally, that is, in the State, even though the epicenter seems distant, in Venezuela,” he emphasizes.

Angles of Impact

From Germany, where, as previously reported, he is engaged in teaching and research activities, Dr. Becerril offers an analysis of the Venezuela situation in three dimensions: globally, in Mexico, and in Yucatán.

In the specific case of Yucatán, he underscores that the economy, with its quintessential tourism vocation, is very sensitive due to three factors:

• a) Tourism and connectivity. — If there is hemispheric tension and insurance and logistics become more expensive (due to rising fuel costs), or interest in the tourist destination declines, there will be an impact on occupancy, services, and direct and indirect employment in the Yucatecan capital, the magical towns, and the entire Emerald Coast, including tourist corridors.
• b) Imported inflation due to the international rise in fuel prices and increased logistical costs (or new land and maritime routes). — An increase in the price of gasoline and diesel will impact the entire Yucatecan economy, pressuring the transportation, production, and distribution of goods, services, and food, and the cost of public works, including the most emblematic ones: the deep-water port, the freight train, and the Welfare Development Poles (cost increases not included in the “historic package” of the Budget), as well as a wide range of private projects.
• c) Federal transfers. The spending schedules directed at Yucatán could undergo a “rescheduling” if the federal budget is “readjusted” due to pressures from the exchange rate, debt service, and higher security and migration costs, generating impacts on the state.

It must be remembered that more than 70 percent of the “historic package” (as the government of Joaquín Díaz Mena calls it) comes from the Federation and is subject to political will.

Effects on Spending

The Uady economist also states the following:

• The exchange rate has direct and indirect effects on state spending. It impacts the costs of imported inputs in construction, equipment, technology, materials, medicines, medical equipment, etc., and a very wide range of imported goods and services. It also affects the prioritization of public projects with a high local component.
• There are also impacts on regional trade and Yucatecan ports. Progreso is a node (a “hub” in Anglo-Saxon jargon). If the United States accelerates reconfiguration, its energy strategy and regional security, as well as maritime flows (including customs, insurance, inspections, compliance, etc.), the Yucatecan economy would feel impacts reflected in increased logistical costs, export competitiveness (food, manufacturing, etc.), and times for the departure and arrival of exports and imports.

For the Americans?

“The White House’s narrative about a Western Hemisphere is also a reason for reflection. It involves the entire American continent, for now from Alaska to Argentine Patagonia, but one must not set aside the interest of the Donald Trump administration in purchasing or pressuring to acquire Greenland from Denmark.”

“The latter is the reason for the label of the new ‘Donroe’ doctrine, alluding to the Monroe Doctrine of ‘America for the Americans,’ in a clear and open contradiction that sanctions and criticizes the Russian invasion of Ukraine, or China’s in Taiwan, but considers that the United States is free to invade Venezuela and Greenland.”

“In this way, surveillance on land and maritime routes will have to be increased and illicit economies displaced. This will push security investment upward. Yucatán’s ‘historic package’ would have to be modified to consider more preventive spending: technology, coordination, and community programs.”

“The Yucatecan executive should shield the self-proclaimed ‘historic package’ against the international scenario: inflation, exchange rate, energy prices, safeguarding of public works, health (medicines and all its inputs), education (and its technological equipment), and public security (technology and equipment).”

“It is essential to have rules for prioritizing state spending, sustaining local multiplier spending: employment, water quality, health, mobility, and social protection for the most vulnerable families. Priority will have to be given to anti-cost clauses in contracts already established with the state executive, due to inflationary adjustment, consolidated purchases, and scheduling.”

“An operational contingency fund is important, rethinking the tourism strategy with confidence campaigns, diversification of options, strengthening of local and national tourism, and, with that, cushioning the possible decline in international tourism. Tourism is the economic lever of Yucatán.”

Mexico and the World

With the allusions to Yucatán, the economist reinforces his points that the fall of the Nicolás Maduro government due to the U.S. military operation is not limited to implications in Venezuela, but has unleashed worldwide vulnerability in security capabilities, energy, control of maritime routes, and financial control.

“Now it is evident, and it is pointed out without mincing words, that the oil on Venezuelan soil is the lever of power and market signal (via prices and volume),” he notes. “The White House narrative under the Trump administration is exerting pressure on the control and administration of the sales and distribution of Venezuelan oil, coupled with the negotiation of ‘barrels of oil’ and opening for new investments and improvements in infrastructure.”

Specifically, the international impact revolves around “Geopolitical Risk,” now not only because of Venezuela, but the intervention has set a precedent that translates into greater uncertainty about sovereignty and possible sanctions in all nations, he emphasizes.

Message to China and Russia

He then indicates:

“The new ‘reconfiguration’ of the flow of Venezuelan crude, returning to Western markets under control and conditionality, is also evident, and with that, prices are pressured in the medium and short term.”

“The other two powers—Russia and the People’s Republic of China—have received the direct message from the United States: the use of military force to ‘reposition’ the strategic asset called oil.”

“For their part, China and Russia are now experiencing a ‘rupture’ of ties with Venezuela, all due to the evident insolvency of payments to their Asian creditors and commercial partners. That is, China loses a close partner and Russia qualifies the act as ‘a violation of sovereignty.'”

“This is precisely what generates a new ‘global order.’ Russia and China will have to shield their investments (with new clauses in their trade treaties, significant guarantees, diversification, and increase their protection and security), expanding their financial, commercial, and insurance alternatives, and with that reduce their vulnerability to sanctions and control from the West, particularly the United States.”

The Reactions in Mexico

Regarding the national sphere, he says this situation has forced the Mexican government to rethink foreign policy on issues of sovereignty, under the narrative of “non-intervention” and to avoid friction with its largest trading partner, the neighboring country to the north.

He also formulates, among others, the following concepts:

“In principle, Mexico expresses its condemnation of the unilateral military action by the U.S. on Venezuela, which could generate rhetorical tensions without a deep economic rupture, because we have commercial integration with the USMCA, since NAFTA 1994, and its renegotiation-renewal in 2020, now USMCA. In addition to logistical dependence and the fiscal juncture.”

“The exchange rate fluctuates under three forces:

1. Global. Fluctuations due to events that generate uncertainty tend to strengthen the American dollar and pressure emerging currencies, like the Mexican peso.
2. Via energy. Mexico is a natural exporter of crude oil and a net importer of refined fuels and petroleum derivatives. Thus, global oil volatility can be ‘ambivalent,’ that is, it improves fiscal revenues for the federal government if the price of crude rises, but makes refined fuels—gasoline and diesel—more expensive, which generates an increase in national prices and, consequently, inflation. That is, it makes life more expensive for Mexican families.
3. Via U.S. foreign policy. If this episode hardens the security agenda and possible sanctions, it will infect hemispheric relations, raising the regional risk premium.

“In the international trade relationship, particularly Mexico and the United States, the Venezuela case accelerated a pattern: using the trade relationship as an instrument of security for the neighboring country, deepening sanctions, control of compliance, and traceability.”

“Thus, Mexico will have to face the following:

1. Higher compliance costs for companies with exposure to sensitive chains.
2. Reputational risk if there is accidental triangulation.
3. Pressure to align to cooperate on security matters.

After presenting a series of concepts about the new international scenario, the Uady research professor emphasizes that the agenda of impacts is broad for Mexico on migratory and labor market issues.

“An example: if Venezuela enters a phase of fiscal, commercial, and employment chaos, it could trigger regional migration and Mexico could have impacts from the pressure on migratory routes, humanitarian costs, and border management, as well as local social tensions in cities receiving migratory flows, and this is very likely to happen in the short term,” he states.

“A sensitive issue for the Mexican economy is the public finances of 2026 at the federal level,” he adds. “Without delving into the Federation’s Expenditure Budget (PEF), the fiscal maneuvering margin is very rigid, due to commitments: pensions, debt service, transfers, and priority infrastructure projects, as well as health and educational sector commitments.”

“The Venezuelan juncture could increase the value of stability and contingency funds, coverage (insurance), and prudence in oil prices,” he points out.